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In recent years, two classes of computable  They show that applying the same assump-
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implications of tariff reductions.
The model also shows the role of foreign
The authors examine the treatment of  trade elasticities in the popular Australian model
exports a.od  imports - and different assump-  - with traded and nontraded goods.  Trade
tions about export demand and import supply  substitution elasticities on the import side play a
behavior - in recent single-country CGE  crucial role in determining the direction of
models of small economies. They present a  change in the real exchange rate during terms-
simple, one-sector analytical model that captures  of-trade perturbations.
the major features of the multisector counterpart
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1.  Introduction
In recent  years,  two  classes  of computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)
trade  models  have  been  used  to investigate  external  sector  policies: single-
country  and  multi-country  trade  models. The  multi-country  trade  models  (e.g.
Deardorff  and  Stern  (1981)  and  Whalley  (1985))  have  typically  been  concerned
with resource  allocation  and  welfare  implications  of tariff  reductions  such  as
those  of the  Tokyo  round. The  single-country  models  have  been  used  to analyze
a  variety  of  external  sector  issues  ranging  from  the  impact  of restrictions  on
foreign  trade  (e.g.  tariffs  and  QRs,  with  or  without  rent  seeking)  to  the
impact  of changes  in  net foreign  transfers  or world  prices  on the  equilibrium
real  exchange  rate.  1/
For  both  types  of  models,  the  results  from  policy  simulations  depend
on how  export  and  import  behavior  are  modelled. In a recent  paper,  Whalley
and Yeung (1984)  --  henceforth WY --  examine this issue for single country
models  using  the  term  "external  closure"  to  refer  to the  various  assumptions
about  export  demand  and  import  supply  behavior. After  noting  that  most
applied  models  are  quite  disaggregated  and  separate  traded  and  non-traded
goods,  they  review  three  external  closure  rules  in  single-country  models.
Among  the  issues  they  raise,  WY choose  a simple  two  commodity  (import  and
export)  formulation  with  no non-traded  commodity  to  show  that  in  these  models,
"...  there  is  no currency  exchange  rate  in the  conventional  use  of the  term  as
a financial  magnitude  determined  from  financial  sector  activity."  2/
In the  second  of their  three  external  closures,  WY assert  that  the
imposition  of  a zero  trade  balance  condition  in  a two-good  CGE  model  that
incorporates  product  differentiation  (i.e.  the  Armington  assumption)  with
price-taking  behavior  for  imports  along  with a  downward-sloping  foreign  export2
demand  curve  with  constant  elasticity  yields  a  model  in  which  both  domestic
and foreign  offer  curves  lie  on top  of one  annother.  3/
They  are  dissatisfied  with this  specification  and  go on to propose  a
third  external  closure:  a  model  with  price  taking  behavfir  and  no product
differentiation  for  tradables,  plus  the  inclusion  of  non-tradables.  In
essence,  this  closure  corresponds  to  a  multi-sector  version  of the  well-known
dependent  economy  (Australian)  trade  theoretic  model. They  show  that  in this
formulation,  there  is  an exchange  rate  variable  --  or "parameter,"  as they
call  it  --  that  measures  the  relative  price  between  composites  of traded  and
non-traded  goods. Tibey  show  that,  in  this  model,  the  foreign  offer  curve  is a
straight  line,  while  the  domestic  offer  curve  has  some  elasticity  (thereby
following  conventional  trade  theory). However,  they  feel  that  this  price
taking  assumption  will  be unpalatable  in  empirical  models  of large
countrieo.  More  generally,  they  note  that  this  model  will  not  allow  two-way
trade,  or cross  hauling,  which  is  widely  observed  in  trade  statistics  at the
aggregation  levels  used  in  all  CGE  models,  and  so  is not  a desirable
specification.
Several  points  about  the  WY analysis  deserve  comment. First,  the
role  of the  exchange  rate  in  computable  general  equilibrium  models  has
received  attention  for  some  time  and  we can  find  no case  in  which  modelers
interpret  it as  a "financial  variable."  4/  Second,  the  two-good  model  with
both  goods  traded  that  IY  use  in their  first  discussion  of external-sector
closure  does  not  represent  well  arty  of the  applied  CGE  trade  models,  which
invariably  include  some  non-traded  goods.  5/  Third,  an  external  closure  using
a price-taking  formulation  for  all tradables  in  a model  with perfect  subs-
titution  will  be  unpalatable  for  stronger  reasons  than  those  mentioned  by
WY.  If the  price-taking  formulation  is not  accompanied  by some  product3
differentiation,  the  model  will  generate  extreme  specialization  whenever  it  is
subjected  to a policy  simulation  such  as reduction  in tariffs. The  assumption
of a  downward-sloping  foreign  demand  curve,  while  it  will  help  (but  not  fix)
the  specialization  problem,  will  lead  to  unrealistically  strong  termu-of-.rade
effects  that  will  dominate  the  welfare  results  of policy  changes  in single
country  models.  6/
The  essence  of the  external  sector  specification  of  most recent
single-country  CGE  trade  models  can  be captured  by a  simple  one  sector  model
with  symmetric  product  differentiation  for  imports  and  exports. This  model
embodies  (and  extends)  well-understood  results  from  neoclassical  trade  theory
and  provides  a compact  statement  of the  external  closures  found  in  most
applied  models. The  model  is  also  useful  to illustrate  the  role  of trade
elasticities  in the  Australian  (dependent  economy)  model  with  trLded  and  non-
traded  goods. We show  that  the  "parameter"  referred  to by  WY in the  analysis
of their  third  external  closure  still  exists  in  this  model. We indicate  how
its  equilibrium  value  is influenced  by the  assumed  values  for  trade  substitu-
tion  elasticities  and  by the  choice  of  weights  used  as  a proxy  for  the
domestic  price  index  in computations  of real  exchange  rate  indices.
With  this  framework,  we provide  a systematic  exploration  of the
behavior  of a small  price  taking  economy  characterized  by product
differentiation  on both  the  export  and  import  sides. We argue  that  reasons
for  introducing  product  differentiation  on the  export  side  are  the  same  as
those  for  introducing  product  differentiation  on the  import  side;  namely,  that
multi-sector  models,  even  when they  are  disaggregated,  do not  disaggregate
products  sufficiently.  This  assumption  has  in fact  been  used by  Dixon  et  al
(1982)  and  by Deardorff  and  Stern  (1986). In  Dixon  et al. (1982),  the
justification  is  based  on producers  engaging  in  joint  production,  as in the4
original  presentation  by Powell  and  Gruen  (1968). While  plausible  under
certain  circumstances,  we think  that  a more  general  reason  along  the  lines
pointed  out  above  is the  more  plausible  rationale  for  introducing  symmetric
product  differentiation.  This  said,  it  should  be pointed  out  (see  Anderson
(1985))  that  calculations  of the  costs  of protection  carried  out  in  aggregate
economy-wide  models  with  product  differentiation  to  overcome  the  problem  of
specialization  may severely  understate  the  costs  of protection,  at least  with
respect  to partial  liberalization.  But  our  purpose  here  is to study  the
properties  of economywide  models,  so this  issue  of  bias  in results  from
applied  models  can  be left  aside.
The remainder  of the  paper  is  organized  as follows: In section  2,
we  present  the  model  and  use it  in section  3 to  show  how  equilibrium  is
affected  by terms-of-trade  shifts  and  by changes  in  net  capital  iflows, both
common  experiments  in single  country  models. The  model  is  also  useful  for
illustrating  the  role  of elasticities  in popular  trade-theoretic  models  that
include  traded  and  non-traded  goods. In Section  4,  we derive  an  expression
for  the  elasticity  of the  domestic  offer  curve  in  our  model  with symmetric
product  differentiation  and  set  up a numerical  example. The  expression  and
the  numerical  example  show  the  role  of initial  conditions  (i.e.  openess  to
trade)  and  of  values  of trade  substitution  elasticities  in determining  the
shape  of the  well-behaved  domestic  offer  curve. We also  illustrate  the  well-
known  fact  that  --  once  weights  entering  the  relevant  price  indices  are  chosen
--  the  equilibrium  value  of the  real  exchange  rate  (defined  as the  relative
price  of traded  to non-traded  goods)  is  indeed  independent  of the  choice  of
numeraire.5
2. A Small-Country  Model  with  Differentiated  Trade
For  many  developing  countries,  it is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the
country  is  "small"  on  world  markets  and  cannot  affect  its  international  terms
of trade. However,  it is  also  reasonable  to  assume  that  world  prices  in the
tradable  sectors  do not  dominate  t'e  domestic  price  system. We present  below
a simple  analytic  model  which  captures  these  stylized  facts  and  discuss  its
theoretical  structure.
Make the  following  assumptions:  (1)  domestically  produced  and
imported  goods  are  imperfect  substitutes  --  the  Armington  assumption;
(2)  domestically  produced  goods  sold  on the  domestic  market  are imperfect
substitutes  for  goods  sold  on the  export  market;  (3)  the  economy  can  purchase
or sell  unlimited  quantities  of imports  and  exports  at constant  world  prices
--  the  small-country  assumption;  (4)  aggregate  production  is  fixed;  and
(5)  there  is a  balance  of trade  constraint.
2.1  Model  Equations
In  Table  1,  equations  1  and  2  give  the  trade  aggregation
functions. In  applied  models,  and  in the  numerical  example  of Section  4,
equation  1 is  a CES  function,  following  Armington,  and  equation  2 is  a CET
(constant  elasticity  of transformation)  function.  7/  For  the  analysis  here,
we only  require  that  F(-)  be convex  to the  origin,  that  G(-)  be concave,  and
that  both  be homogenous  of degree  one  in  their  arguments. Given  the
aasumption  of fixed  output,  which  is equivalent  to  assuming  full  employment,
G(-)  represents  a production  possibility  frontier  delineating  the  tradeoffn
between  exports  and  domestic  supply.
Equations  (3)  and  (4)  translate  foreign  prices  into  domestic  prices
using  a conversion  factor,  r,  which  we refer  to  as the  "nominal"  exchange6
Table  1
A  One Sector  Small-Countrv  Model  with  Differentiated  Trade
(1)  Q *  F(M,Dd)  Impurt  aggregation  function
(2)  - G(E,D 5)  Export  transformation  function
(3)  pm  - r ;m  Import  price
(4)  pe m r we  Export  price
(5)  Pq  . f1(p¶  pd)  Consumer  price
(6)  p  *  g(pe,pd  )  Producer  price
(7)  Md . f  2(pmpd)  Import  demand  equation
Dd 
(8)  Es  g2 Pe=P  Export  supply  equation
D
(9)  - M - w  E  =B  Balance  of trade  constraint
(10)  Dd - Ds  =  0  Domestic demand - supply
equilibrium
where:
M,E  =  imports,  exports
Dd,Ds  =  demand  and  supply  of the  domestic  good.
Q  =  composite  consumer  good
X  =  composite  production
-m  world  price  of imports
we  world price of exports
r  Conversion  factor;  "nominal"  exchange  rate
pm  domestic price of imports,  M
pe  =  domestic price of exports, E
pd  =  domestic  price  of domestic  sales,  D
pq  =  domestic  price  of composite  consumer  good,  Q
px  =  domestic  price  of composite  output,  X
B  exogenous  balance  of trade,  or net foreign  capitaL  inflow  (or
outflow  for  negative  B).7
rate.  It  should  be clear,  but is  worth  repeating  (as  has  been  pointed  out  by
DMR and  WY)  that  this  conversion  factor,  r, is  not a financial  exchange  rate
variable. Though  often  referred  to as "the"  exchange  rate,  we refer  to  it as
the  "nominal"  exchange  rate  so  as not  to  confuse  it  with  the  real  exchange
rate  --  the  relative  price  of the  domestic  good  in terms  of the  (fixed)  traded
goods  --  which  is  determined  by the  model. Indeed,  the  model  could  be  written
without reference to r --  as is common in trade theory --  by implicitly
choosing  it  as numeraire. We use  this  approach  below  in Section  2.2.
However,  since  we wish to  consider  alternative  choices  of the  numeraire,  we
maintain  r in  our  formulation.  8/
We assume  that  producers  maximize  profits  and  that  demanders
minimize  the  cost  of  purchasing  a given  quantity  of composite  good  Q.  9/
These  assumptions  lead  to  equations  5 to  8.  Equations  5  and  6 define
composite  good  prices  and  are  effectively  dual  cost  functions. They  are
homogeneous  of degree  one  in input  prices. Equations  7  and  8 give  the  demand
for  imports  and  supply  of exports  arising  from  the  first-order  conditions.
Since  only  relative  prices  matter,  the  functions  describing  the
model  are  homogeneous  of degree  zero  in prices. To set  the  absolute  price
level,  select  r  as numeraire. Equation  9  gives  the  equilibrium  condition  for
the  balance  of trade;  that  in foreign  units  (expressed  in terms  of the
numeraire)  the  value  of imports  equals  the  value  of exports  plus  B.  Finally,
equation  10  is the  equilibrium  condition  for  the  supply  and  demand  for  the
domestic  good. Overall,  the  model  has  10  equations  and 10  endogenous
variables: Q,  M, Dd,  Ds,  E,  pm,  pe,  pd,  pq,  and  px.  The  homogeneity  of
equations  1  and  2  guarantee  that  the  system  satisfies  Walras'  Law.  This  can
be  easily  seen  by  writing  out  the  aggregate  income  and  expenditure  equations:8
P  +  rB  total  income
PXX  - PeE+ PdDa  the  value  of production  or  GDP
PqQ  - P'M  +  PdDd  Total  expenditure  or absorption
Given  the  equilibrium  conditions  In  equations  9  and  10,  it  follows  that  income
always  equals  expenditure.  The  variable,  B, in  equation  9,  denominated  in
foreign  units,  can  be thought  of  as representing  an increase  (or  decrease)  in
real  income  measured  in terms  of imports,  given  the  fixed  world  price  of
imports.
2.2. A Graphical  Presentation
This  model  is  simple  enough  so that  its  properties  can  be shown
graphically.  Figure  1  presents  a four-quadrant  diagram  that  captures  the
essential  features. For  convenience,  choose  units  so  that  the  exogenous  world
prices  for  both  exports  and  imports  equal  one.  Also,  set  r  as numeraire  and
initially  assume  B  - 0.  In this  case,  the  balance  of trade  equation  defines
the  foreign  offer  curve  and  graphs  as a  45-degree  line  in quadrant  1.  The
production  possibility  frontier,  PP,  (equation  2) is  graphed  in quadrant  4.
Quadrant  3 has  a  45-degree  line  which  simply  indicates  that  domestic  goods,  D,
which  are  supplied  to  the  domestic  market,  are  available  for  demand,  defining
equilibrium  in  the  domestic  goods  market. The  concave  curve,  CC,  in  quadrant
2 is  the  consumption  possibility  frontier,  which  is the  locus  of points  that
simultaneously  satisfy  the  balance  of trade  constraint  in  quadrant  1  and  the
production  possibility  frontier  in  3-.drant  4.  Given  our  choice  of  units  and
the  assumption  that  the  balance  of trade  equals  zero,  the  consumption
possibility  frontier  in quadrant  2 is  a  mirror  image  of the  production
possibility  frontier,  PP,  in  quadrant  4.9
Figure 1
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In quadrant  2, the  import  aggregation  function,  equation  1,
generates  a series  of "iso-good"  curves,  II,  analogous  to indifference
curves.  10/  Equilibrium  is  achieved  at the  point  of tangency  with  the
consumption  possibility  frontier. At this  point,  the  equilibrium  price
ratios,  pd/pm  and  pO/pe,  equal  the  slope  of the  tangents  in  quadrants  2  and  4,
and  are  derived  from  the  first-order  conditions  in  equations  7  and  8. 11/
Given  our  choice  of units,  the  two  ratios  are  equal,  and  the  equilibrium  value
of pd is  the  equilibrium  value  of the  relative  price  of non-tradables  to
tradables.  Thus,  selecting  r as  numeraire  is  convenient  since  it  allows  us to
interpret  Pd as the  real  exchange  rate.  In  this  model,  the  foreign  offer
curve  is  the  450  line  in  the  M,E  quadrant  in  figure  1. We derive  in section  4
the  elasticity  of the  domestic  offer  curve  and  show  that  it is  a well-behaved
curve  which  intersects  the  straight-line  foreign  offer  curve.
Consider  the  limicing  "Ricardian"  case  corresponding  to  an
infinitely  elastic  supply  of exports. Then  PP  becomes  a straight  line,  which
in  turn  implies  a straight  line  censumption  possibility  curve. The real
exchange  rate  is  now fixed  and,  as in  a  Ricardian  world,  is  determined  by
technology.  Substitution  possibilities  in  demand  only  determine  the
composition  of production  for  domestic  and for  export  sales.
Our  graphical  presentation  can  also  be used  to  consider  the  closure
criticized  by  WY;  namely,  a specification  with  product  differentiation  on the
import  side  and  with  less  than  infinitely  elastic  foreign  export  demand. rn
e =E  -I/C this  case,  the  model  would  include  an extra  equation,  n  = [  I  ,  where
E0
C  >  1 is  the  constant  price  elasticity  of foreign  export  demand  and  w  e is now
endogenous.  Now  the  foreign  offer  curve  is  given  by:  12/
M - E 1/c  Ea ;  a  1  - 1/c  ;  0 < a  < 1  (2.1)
011
e which  is  derived  by substituting  the  above  expression  for se  into  the  balance
of trade  constraint.  This  case  is  depicted  in  figure  2,  where  Eo is the
equilibrium  under  the  small  country  assumption  (i.e.  a  =  1).  With  market
power,  the  foreign  offer  curve  becomes  OC,  and  the  corresponding  consumption
possibility  curve  is  CoC 1 with new  equilibrium  at  E1. From  the  diagram,  one
can  see  that  assuming  market  power  leads  to  an optimum  with less  trade  and  a
correspondingly  lower  real  exchange  rate.
Clearly  this  model,  which  is representative  of  many single-country
CGE  models,  does  not  suffer  from  the  problem  of overlapping  offer  curves
described  by WY in  their  discussion  of a similar  model  with  constant  price
elasticities  of foreign  demand  and  import  supply.  As we have  shown,  the
foreign  offer  curve  in this  model  has  the  usual  shape. As  we analyze  in some
detail  below,  the  shape  of the  domestic  offer  curve  depends  only  on the
parameters  of the  export  transformation  and  import  aggregation  functions  and
also  has  the  usual  shape. Hence  the  two  offer  curves  will  intersect,  but  will
certainly  not  coincide.
3.  Terms-of-Trade  and  Transfers: A  Graphical  Analysis
Is the  one  sector  model  with  differentiated  trade  well  behaved? We
examine  two  typical  experiments  conducted  with  single-country  models: a terms-
of-trade  shift  and  a change  in  foreign  transfers.
3.1  Terms-of-Trade  Change
Figure  3 shows  the  effect  on  equilibrium  of  an improvement  in  the
e  e terms-of-trade  (TOT 0 + TOT 1) corresponding  to  an increase  in ff,  dir  >  0.
This  terms-of-trade  change  shifts  out  the  consumption  possibility  schedule  to
CoC 1. Will  the  economy  supply  a larger  volume  of exports  at this  improved12
FIgure  2
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terms-of-trade?  The  result  depends  on the  shape  of the  domestic  offer  curve.
As drawn  in  figure  3, exports  fall. The  demand  for  the  domestic  good
increases,  which  in turn  implies  that  the  domestic  offer  curve,  FF,  is
inelastic. 13/ Also  note  that  the  real  exchange  rate  will  appreciate.  -In  the
limiting  "Ricardian"  case  considered  above,  the  real  exchange  appreciation  will
d  -e. be equal  to  the  change  in  the  terms  of trade,  i.e.  dp  d7
3.2  An Increase  in Foreign  Transfers
Figure  4 shows  the  effect  on equilibrium  of  an increase  in  foreign
transfers. The  effect  of a transfer,  B, is  an upward  parallel  shift  of the
external  budget  constraint  to  0101  and  the  consumption  possibility  curve  to
C1Ci.  Will  the  increase  in transfers  lead  to  a real  exchange  rate
appreciation,  as  one  would  expect  in a  model  where  the  domestic  good  is
consumed? Yes,  if the  domestic  goods  are  not inferior  in  c  aumption,  which  is
the  case  drawn  in figure  4  and  is guaranteed  for  the  CES  function  used  in
practice. Domestic  consumption  of D increases,  exports  fall,  and  imports  rise.
The  graphical  apparatus  developed  here  can  also  be used  to  examine
the  effects  of a  change  in commercial  policy. This  is  not  done  here  since  it
does  not  lead  to  any  new  insights  about  the  properties  of the  external  closure
under  review. We conclude  that  the  specified  external  closure  gives  rise  to a
well-defined  real  exchange  rate  whose  variations  to policy  changes  is in accord
with the  usual  assumptions  of  neoclassical  trade  theory  for  small
economies. The  assumption  of product  differentiation  thus  leads  to  a  much  more
realistic  small-country  model  that  can  accommodate  two-way  trade  and  a  degree
of autonomy  in the  domestic  price  system,  but  retains  all  the  desirable
features  of the  standard  neoclassical  model.is
Figure  4
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4.  A Numerical  Example
We conclude  with  a simple  numerical  example  to  show  the  influence  of
different  parameter  values  on computed  equilibria  for  an increase  in  transfers
and  a terms-of-trade  change. Assume,  a* in  typical  applications,  that  the
import  aggregation  function  is CES  and  the  export  transformation  is  CET.  Then
equations  (1)  and  (2)  in  Table  1 are  given  by:
-1
Q  A1 (A  M  +  (1-8  )D P )  p  a  (4.1)
I
- - ~h  h  h  h-I2
X  A2  a  En + (1 a)  D )h  h-l  42
where  a bar  denotes  an exogenous  variable  and  a  and Q  are  elasticities  of
substitution  and  transformation  respectively.  Following  the  calibration  common
in  CGE  models,  we construct  parameters  for  the  CES  and  CET  functions  to  produce
the  initial  equilibrium  formulated  in table  2 such  that  all  prices  are  unity,
-- e  s  e  =  r.px  =  pm _  pe =1  / i.e.  m  e  r =x~  ~  *  14/
Table  3 shows  th-  effects  on the  welfare  indicator,  Q, (Col.  3) and
on the  real  exchange  rate  (Col.  4) of  setting  transfers  equal  to 10  --  i.e.  to
10%  of initial  GDP  --  under  different  values  of the  elasticities  of import
substitution  and  export  transformation.  Note that,  in  the  limit,  the  increase
in  welfare  is  equal  to the  transfer  itself. This  result  occurs  when the
marginal  rate  of transformation  of production  between  sales  to the  domestic  and
export  markets  is  infinite,  i.e.  in the  Ricardian  case  discussed  above. As
expected,  the  required  real  exchange  rate  adjustment  to absorb  the  transfer  is
an increasing  function  of the  curvature  of the  CES  and  CET  functions.17
Table  2
Base  Solution  Values
Transfer  (I)  Exports  (E)  Imports  (M)  Domestic  Demand  (D)  CDP (2)
0  25  25  75  10018
In this  example,  the  numeraire  is  pq = 1.  Had  we selected  another
numeraire  such  as fixing  the  value  of the  GDP  deflator  with base  year  quantity
weights  (i.e.,  to set  px  1),  then  the  equilibrium  values  of the  "nominal"
exchange  rate  (or  conversion  factor)  in  column  S  would  have  been  replaced  by
d the  values  appearing  in column  6.  Likewise,  with  p  1  as numeraire,  the
equilibrium  values  for  the  "nominal"  exchange  rate  would  have  been  given  by the
values  in  column  4.  And,  with  r _  1  as  numeraire,  the  equilibrium  value  of
pd  appearing  in  column  4 would  have  corresponded  to the  equilibrium  value  of
the  real  exchange  rate.  Regardless  of the  choice  of numeraire,  the  equilibrium
values  of the  relative  price  indices  appearing  in  columns  4 and  6 of table  3
remain  unaltered.
In this  one sector  model,  there  is  no ambiguity  with respect  to  the
appropriate  definition  of the  real  exchange  rate,  r/pd.  In  applied  work,
however,  two  problems  arise. In  multisector  CGE  applications,  a choice  must be
made  with  respect  to the  weights  entering  the  aggregator  for  the  domestic  price
index. Even  though  the  choice  of  weights  will  affect  the  computed  values  for
the  equilibrium  r-al  exchange  rate,  the  equilibrating  mechanism  working  through
changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate  is  the  same,  no matter  what  price  is  chosen
as numeraire.
The  other  problem  relates  to the  choice  of  weights  used  to proxy  the
domestic  price  index  in computations  of real  exchange  rate  indices. Typically,
the  domestic  price  index  is  proxied  by  some  published  price  index  such  as the
CPI  or the  GDP  deflator,  both  of  which  include  traded  goods. As  shown  by the
values  in  the  last  two  columns  of  Table  3,  when  values  of  a  and Q  are  low,  the
choice  of proxy  for  the  domestic  price  index  makes  a great  deal  of difference
in the  computed  value  of the  real  exchange  rate. For  example,  with19
Table  3
Welfare  and  Real  Exchange  Rate  Calculations  for  an Increase  in  Transfers  al
cn  .... /  Q  r/pd  r  r/p
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
.2  .2  106.9  .38  .46  .45
.5  .5  1.08.7  .68  .75  .74
2  2  109.6  .91  .93  ,93
5  5  109.9  .96  .97  .91
5  X  110.0  1.00  1.00  1.00
Transfer  (K)  set  equal  to  10.
kI  Elasticity  of substitution  in CES  (eq.l,  table  1  and  eq.4.1).
c/  Elasticity  of transformation  in  CET (eq.2,  table  2 and  eq.4.2).20
a  - a  =  0.5,  the  real  exchange  rate  index  with  CPI  (or  GDP)  weights  used  as
proxy  has  a value  of  0.75 (0.74)  whereas  the  correct  value  is  0.68.
Finally  we come  to the  shape  of the  offer  curve. It  can  be shown
oc that  the  elasticity  of the  offer  curve,  e0, is  given  by the  following
expression:  15/
oc  _  a  (a +  z)  1a aQ  +(3
where  a+  )
X  - (l - )  a(l-  )  a
From  expression  (4.3),  it  is clear  that  the  offer  curve  will  be  vertical
(£oc- - )  for a  =  1,  positively  sloping  (soc  > 1) for a  > 1  and  negatively
sloping  (eoc  <  0) for a  < 1. For  given  values  of  Q  ,  ec monotonically
decreases  for  increasing  values  of  a  (with  discontinuity  at a  =  1).  For  given
values  of a  ,  the  curvature  of the  offer  curve  is less  (oec  is lower),
the  higher  is the  value  of a  . Finally,  for  given  values  of  a  and a  ,  the
value  of  sc  is larger,  the  more  open  is  the  economy. 16/
Figures  5(a)  and  5(b)  trace  the  elasticity  of the  domestic  offer
oc curve  for  different  values  of a  ,  a * 1.  Negative  values  of  c  correspond  t3
a backward  bending  offer  curve. In this  case,  the  income  effect  of  al;
improvement  in  the  terms  of trade  dominates  the  substitution  effect  and  less
oc exports  are  supplied. Negative  values  of  c  imply  that  the  real  exchange
rate  must  appreciate  to  insure  a greater  supply  to  the  domestic  market  (this
is the  case  drawn  in  Figure  3).  Raising  the  elasticity  of export  supply
lowers  the  offer  curve  elasticity,  which  in the  limit  is  unity. This  result
follows  directly  from  the  relation  between  the  two  elasticities  along  the21
Figure  5
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external  budget  constraint. Increasing  the  degree  of openess  raises  the  offer
curve  elasticity,  a result  also  found  in  standard  trade-theoretic  models.
Finally,  Figure  6 traces  the  equilibrium  values  obtained  from
solving  the  model  with the  initial  conditions  il Table  6 under  a  high  and  a
low  set  of trade  substitution  elasticities.  Figure  6 draws  the  equilibrium
values  of the  welfare  indicator,  the  real  exchange  rate,  and  the  import  share
in  absorption  for  different  values  of the  terms-of-trade.  The  arrows  indicate
the  path  of the  variables  as the  terms-of-trade  improve. As expected,  welfare
gains  measured  here  in  terms  of  absorption,  Q) are  larger  for  the  higher  set
of trade  substitution  elasticities.  The  higher  gain  attributable  to  greater
specialization  appears  as  a much  larger  variation  in  the  share  of imports  in
absorption  for  the  high  value  of a  . More importantly,  Figure  6 confirms  the
critical  role  assumed  by the  value  of o  in determining  whether  the  real
exchange  rate  will  appreciate  or depreciate  when  the  terms-of-trade  varies.
The  two  numerical  examples  in  figure  6 could  be  construed  to
represent  a developing  country  with  a low  import  substitution  elasticity  and  a
developed  country  with a  higher  elasticity.  For  the  developing  country,
adjusting  to the  deterioration  in its  terms-of-trade  requires  a real
devaluation  to  generate  increased  exports  required  to pay  for  more  expensive
crucial  imports. For  the  developed  country,  adjustment  requires  a real
revaluation  and  a decline  in  the  volume  of foreign  trade.
5.  Conclusions
In  this  paper,  we have  studied  systematically  the  typical  external
closure  of many  single-country  applied  general  equilibrium  trade  models. We23
Flgure  6
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have  shown  that  the  standard  assumption  of  product  differentiation  on the
import  side  can  be naturally  extended  to the  export  side. An external  closure
with symmetric  product  differentiation  for  imports  and  exports  is theoretic-
ally  well-behaved  and  gives  rise  to normally  shaped  offer  curves. We derive
the  elasticity  of the  domestic  off,r  curve  for  a  one  sector  model  and  illu-
strate  the  model  with  a numerical  example. The  numerical  example  illustrates,
under  different  trade  substitution  elasticities,  the  implications  of the
choice  of weights  used  as a proxy  for  the  domestic  price  index  in computations
of real  exchange  rate  indices. The  model  is also  useful  to illustrate  the
role  of foreign  trade  elasticities  in the  popular  Australian  model  with  traded
and  non-traded  goods. In  particular,  we show  the  crucial  role  of trade
substitution  elasticities  on the  import  side  in  determining  the  direction  of
change  of the  real  exchange  rate  for  terms-of-trade  perturbations.25
Appendix
1.  Derivation  of Equilibrium  Conditions  in Figure  1.
To show  that  in  equilibrium  the  MRS in  consumption  in  quadrant  (2)  is
equal  to the  MRT in production  in  quadrant  (4),  maximize  (1)  subject  to
(2)  and  (9)  by setting  the  following  Lagrangian:
Maximize:
(Al)  L Q  -X  1 X  - G(E,D)1  -XbCi  _ mM  +  ;e El
The  first-order  conditions  are
(A)  a=  Q+x  [,=  0
3D  aD  x aD
(A3)  a3M  M  Qb  +  =
(A4)  aE  Xx j|  - xe  =0
From (A4)
(A5)  b  )x  aE  /
Substitute  (A5)  into  (A3):
(A6)  am  m  x a26
Divide  (A6)  into  (A2)  to  get:
aQ aM)  m  aITaE
Choose  units  so that ne =  nm  * 1.  This  establishes  the  condition  asserted
in the  text,  i.e.
a /aD  d,  q  G  a  d  s  d  d 
(AS)  g  pmlpq  3/3DaE  pde/px  pm  pe
2.  Derivation  of Elasticity  of Offer  Curve  (Equation  4.3)  17/
We proceed  in  two  steps. First,  we derive  the  relation  between  M and  E
when  MRS = MRT.  In the  second  step  we bring  in the  balance  of trade
constraint.
From  (4.2)  note  that  the  CET  defines  a relation  between  E  and  D, i.e.
(A9)  D (E,i)  =  [ (j)Ah  a  (-y  Ehih
A2
Using  (A9)  in the  FOC  of the  Lagrangian  in (Al)  we  have:
(AlO)  aL  aQ  m  =0 3m  3m  b
(All)  - - aD aE  b
Dividing  (A1O)  and (All)  and rearranging  gives:
(A12)  aQ  Tr
am  -e  3D  3E27
The  partial  derivatives  in (A12)  are  obtained  from  differentiation  of
(4.1),  (4.2)  and (A9).
(A13)  IQ  =  BA  (BMzP  +  (1-B)D0P)  P  M-(P+L)
am  1
-(1  .op)
(A14)  3Q =  (1-0)  (SM0P +  (1-B)D  0 )  P  D (P+1)
-h  1-h
(A15)  3D =  Eh j  h  Ehi1
aE  1-rn  Rh(-n)  (-n
Substitution  of (A13),  (A14)  and (A15)  into  (A12)  yields,  after
manipulation,  the  following:
-m  -l  -h  o+h  -h-1
(A16)  M(  P-)  )  [  ih  - (  )  E  P  I
;e  (1r)  (-h  n  (Irn
Which  gives  the  relation  between  M and  E  when  MRS  =  MRT.
The second  step  involves  taking  into  account  the  balance  of trade
constraint,
-m
(A17)  E =  M -e
Substituting  (A16)  into  (A17)  and  rearranging  gives  the  required
equilibrium  relation  between  E  and  M:
(A18)  E  1a  )Q+l  a
(A18)  E  X  (  ai  +  ([-a)  )r  '  -e1-))aI  +  1-  =
A2  ;~~M  (1-ci)s28
To get  an expression  for  the  elasticity  of the  offer  curve, E  note
that  the  following  relationships  hold  along  an offer  curve:
(A19)  OC  I  +  I  e  £  +  Ed  =  es  x  m
where  x
eoc  d log  M  Ed  d log  M  s  d log  e
d  log E  m  -m  x  -e
(d log  -e)  (d log m) -e  -M
Log  differentiation  of (A18)  and  some  algebraic  manipulation  eventually
yields:
Q+a  -e  n-O
(A20)  s =  -l)-a)Y  n
x  ~~~~~~-e  it  -
where  (a+1){o+(1-c)[(!)  ;_-a)y  aJ4ao}
;e  -m
By choice  of units  let  e =  =1.  Then  (A20)  simplifies  to
(A21)  x  (a+Q)  (a+)+
where  I(l+0)
(l-a)  Y  1  ( 
Substitution  of (A21)  into  (A19)  yields  equation  (4.3)  in the  text.29
Footnotes
1/  Dervis,  de  Melo  and  Robinson  (1982)  --  henceforth  DMR  --  review  the
theoretical  specification  of single  country  trade  models  and  present
a number  of applications  analyzing  the  types  of issues  mentioned
above. Robinson  (1989)  reviews  recent  models.
2/  Whalley  and  Yeung  (1984),  p. 126.
3/  WY also  note  that  because  export  and  import  demand  elasticities  are
not independent,  the  reduced  forms  for  the  export  and import  demand
functions  differ  from  the  specification  intended. Although
econometricians  do not  typically  incorporate  the  restrictions  implied
by  balanced  trade  when they  estimate  export  demand  and  import  supply
elasticities,  the  point  that  trade  balance  restrictions  should  be
recognized  in specifying  combinations  of export  demand  and import
supply  elasticities  is  correct  and  nicely  made. For  a general
treatment  in  the  n-commodity  case  see  Jones  and  Berglas  (1977).
4/  See  for instance  DMR  chp.  6, sections  2  and  3,  who  discuss  the  role
of the  real  exchange  rate  in  general  equilibrium  models.
5/  WY do consider  in  equations  (22-25)  a formulation  with  one  domestic
good,  but  only  for  an exchange  economy. As argued  below,  this
I  formulation  is  not  a simplified  representation  of  a typical  single-
country  CGE  trade  model.
6/  See  DMR  ch.  6 for  a discussion  of specialization  and  ch.  7  for  an
alternative  specification  for  export  behavior. The  empirical
importance  of terms-of-trade  effects  with  downward-sloping  foreign
export  demand  curves  is shown  in  chapter  9.
7/  The  CET formulation  was first  suggested  by Powell  and  Gruen  (1969).
Though  more  elegant  and  easier  to  work  with  than  the  Logistic  supp.,
curve  proposed  by  DMR, it  can  be shown  that  the  two  specifications30
are  empirically  very  close  for  local  changes  around  equilibrium.
De  Melo  and  Robinson  (1985)  explore  analytically  in  a partial
equilibrium  context,  the  implications  of product  differentiation  on
the  domestic  price  system.
8/  Under  appropriate  numeraire  selection,  r becomes  the  real  exchange
rate,  in  which  case  it should  he referred  to  as such.
9/  In fact,  for  the  analysis  here,  we could  assume  that  equation  1  is  a
utility  function  which  consumers  seek  to  maximize.
1O/  If  we replace  equation  1  with  an explicit  utility  function,  the  "iso-
goods"  can  be interpreted  as indifference  curves. Nothing  changes  in
the  analysis.
11/  This  result  can  be derived  from  the  maximization  of (1)  subject  to
(2)  and  (9)  and is  derived  in  the  appendix.
12/  Note  that  for  0  < Z  < 1,  the  external  constraint  slopes  downwards.
13/  We show  below  that  the  shape  of the  domestic  offer  curve  depends  on
the  two  substitution  elasticities  and  on trade  shares.
14/  The  numeraire  is  Pq  1  and  the  solution  is  found  by solving  the
maximization  problem  set  in  the  appendix  using  the  GAMS  package
developed  by  Arne Drud  and  Alex  Meeraus.
15/  This result  is  derived  in the  appendix  with  we =  nm  =  1  by  choice  f
units.
16/  Openess  is  defined  in  the  sense  of high  initial  trade  (E/D,  M/D)
shares.
17/  We thank  David  RoLand-Holst  for  suggesting  the  approach  foLlowed  :
this  derivation.31
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